I
was happy, when I got the invitation to give the John Danz Lectures, to hear
that there would be three lectures, as I had thought about these ideas at great
length and wanted an opportunity not to express myself in only one lecture, but
to develop the ideas slowly and carefully in three lectures. I found out that I
developed them slowly and carefully, completely, in two.
I
have completely run out of organized ideas, but I have a large number of
uncomfortable feelings about the world which I haven’t been able to put into
some obvious, logical, and sensible form. So, since I already contracted to
give three lectures, the only thing I can do is to give this potpourri of
uncomfortable feelings without having them very well organized.
Perhaps
someday, when I find a real deep reason behind them all, I will be able to give
them in one sensible lecture instead of this thing. Also, in case you are
beginning to believe that some of the things I said before are true because I am
a scientist and according to the brochure that you get I won some awards and so
forth, instead of your looking at the ideas themselves and judging them
directly—in other words, you see, you have some feeling toward authority—I will
get rid of that tonight. I dedicate this lecture to showing what ridiculous
conclusions and rare statements such a man as myself can make. I wish,
therefore, to destroy any image of authority that has previously been
generated.
You
see, a Saturday night is a night for entertainment, and that is… I think I have
got the right spirit now and we can go on. It is always a good to entitle a
lecture in a way that nobody can believe. It is either peculiar or it is just
the opposite of what you would expect. And that is the reason, of course, for
calling it “This Unscientific Age.” Of course if you mean by scientific the
applications of technology, there is no doubt that this is a scientific age.
There is no doubt at all that today we have all kinds of scientific
applications which are causing us all kinds of trouble as well as giving us all
kinds of advantages. And so in that sense it certainly is a scientific age. If
you mean by a scientific age an age in which science is developing rapidly and
advancing fully as fast as it can, then this is definitely a scientific age.
The
speed at which science has been developing for the last two hundred years has
been ever increasing, and we reach a culmination of speed now. We are in
particular in the biological sciences, on the threshold of the most remarkable
discoveries. What they are going to be I am unable to tell you. Naturally, that
is the excitement of it. And the excitement that comes from turning one stone
over after another and finding underneath new discoveries has been going on now
perpetually for several hundred years, and it is an ever-rising crescendo. This
is, in that sense, definitely a scientific age. It has been called a heroic
age, by a scientist, of course. Nobody else knows about it. Sometime when
history looks back at this age they will see that it was a most dramatic and
remarkable age, the transformation from not knowing much about the world to
knowing a great deal more than was known before. But if you mean that this is
an age of science in the sense that in art, in literature, and in people’s
attitudes and understandings, and so forth science plays a large part, I don’t
think it is a scientific age at all. You see, if you take, the heroic age of
the Greeks, say, there were poems about the military heroes. In the religious period
of the Middle Ages, art was related directly to religion, and people’s
attitudes toward life were definitely closely knit to the religious viewpoints.
It was a religious age. This is not a scientific age from that point of view.
Now,
that there are unscientific things is not my grief. That’s a nice word. I mean,
that is not what I am worrying about, that there are unscientific things. That
something is unscientific is not bad; there is nothing the matter with it. It
is just unscientific. And scientific is limited, of course, to those things
that we can tell about by trial and error. For example, there is the absurdity
of the young these days chanting things about purple people eaters and hound
dogs, something that we cannot criticize at all if we belong to the old flat
foot floogie and a floy floy or the music goes down and around. Sons of mothers
who sang about “come, Josephine, in my flying machine,” which sounds just about
as modern as “I’d like to get you on a slow boat to China.” So in life, in gaiety,
in emotion, in human pleasures and pursuits, and in literature and so on, there
is no need to be scientific, there is no reason to be scientific. One must
relax and enjoy life. That is not the criticism. That is not the point.
But
if you do stop to think about it for a while, you will find that there are
numerous, mostly trivial things which are unscientific, unnecessarily. For
instance, there are extra seats in the front here, even though there are people
[standing in the back].
While
I was talking to some of the students in one of the classes, one man asked me a
question, which was, “Are there any attitudes or experiences that you have when
working in scientific information which you think might be useful in working
with other information?”
(By
the way, I will at the end say how much of the world today is sensible,
rational, and scientific. It’s a great deal. So, I am only taking the bad parts
first. It’s more fun. Then we soften it at the end. And I latched onto that as
a nice organizing way to make my discussion of all the things that I think are
unscientific in the world.)
I
would like, therefore, to discuss some of the little tricks of the trade in
trying to judge an idea. We have the advantage that we can ultimately refer the
idea to experiment in the sciences, which may not be possible in other fields.
But nevertheless, some of the ways of judging things, some of the experiences
undoubtedly are useful in other ways. So, I start with a few examples.
The
first one has to do with whether a man knows what he is talking about, whether
what he says has some basis or not. And my trick that I use is very easy. If
you ask him intelligent questions—that is, penetrating, interested, honest,
frank, direct questions on the subject, and no trick questions—then he quickly
gets stuck. It is like a child asking naive questions. If you ask naive but
relevant questions, then almost immediately the person doesn’t know the answer,
if he is an honest man. It is important to appreciate that. And I think that I
can illustrate one unscientific aspect of the world which would be probably
very much better if it were more scientific. It has to do with politics.
Suppose two politicians are running for president, and one goes through the
farm section and is asked, “What are you going to do about the farm question?”
And he knows right away—bang, bang, bang. Now he goes to the next campaigner
who comes through. “What are you going to do about the farm problem?” “Well, I
don’t know. I used to be a general, and I don’t know anything about farming.
But it seems to me it must be a very difficult problem, because for twelve,
fifteen, twenty years people have been struggling with it, and people say that
they know how to solve the farm problem. And it must be a hard problem. So the
way that I intend to solve the farm problem is to gather around me a lot of
people who know something about it, to look at all the experience that we have
had with this problem before, to take a certain amount of time at it, and then
to come to some conclusion in a reasonable way about it. Now, I can’t tell you
ahead of time what conclusion, but I can give you some of the principles I’ll
try to use—not to make things difficult for individual farmers, if there are
any special problems we will have to have some way to take care of them,” etc.,
etc., etc.
Now
such a man would never get anywhere in this country, I think. Its never been
tried, anyway. This is in the attitude of mind of the populace, that they have
to have an answer and that a man who gives an answer is better than a man who
gives no answer, when the real fact of the matter is, in most cases, it is the
other way around. And the result of this of course is that the politician must
give an answer. And the result of this is that political promises can never be
kept. It is a mechanical fact; it is impossible. The result of that is that
nobody believes campaign promises. And the result of that is a general
disparaging of politics, a general lack of respect for the people who are
trying to solve problems, and so forth. It’s all generated from the very
beginning (maybe—this is a simple analysis). Its all generated, maybe, by the
fact that the attitude of the populace is to try to find the answer instead of
trying to find a man who has a way of getting at the answer.
Now
we try another item that comes in the sciences—I give only one or two
illustrations of each of the general ideas—and that is how to deal with
uncertainty. There have been a lot of jokes made about ideas of uncertainty. I
would like to remind you that you can be pretty sure of things even though you
are uncertain, that you don’t have to be so in-the-middle, in fact not at all
in-the-middle. People say to me, “Well, how can you teach your children what is
right and wrong if you don’t know?” Because I’m pretty sure of what’s right and
wrong. I’m not absolutely sure; some experiences may change my mind. But I know
what I would expect to teach them. But, of course, a child won’t learn what you
teach him.
I
would like to mention a somewhat technical idea, but it’s the way, you see, we
have to understand how to handle uncertainty. How does something move from
being almost certainly false to being almost certainly true? How does
experience change? How do you handle the changes of your certainty with
experience? And it’s rather complicated, technically, but I’ll give a rather
simple, idealized example.
You
have, we suppose, two theories about the way something is going to happen,
which I will call “Theory A” and “Theory B.” Now it gets complicated. Theory A
and Theory B. Before you make any observations, for some reason or other, that
is, your past experiences and other observations and intuition and so on,
suppose that you are very much more certain of Theory A than of Theory B—much
more sure. But suppose that the thing that you are going to observe is a test.
According to Theory A, nothing should happen. According to Theory B, it should
turn blue. Well, you make the observation, and it turns sort of a greenish.
Then you look at Theory A, and you say, “It’s very unlikely,” and you turn to
Theory B, and you say, “Well, it should have turned sort of blue, but it wasn’t
impossible that it should turn sort of greenish color.” So the result of this
observation, then, is that Theory A is getting weaker, and Theory B is getting
stronger. And if you continue to make more tests, then the odds on Theory B
increase. Incidentally, it is not right to simply repeat the same test over and
over and over and over, no matter how many times you look and it still looks
greenish, you haven’t made up your mind yet. But if you find a whole lot of
other things that distinguish Theory A from Theory B that are different, then
by accumulating a large number of these, the odds on Theory B increase.
Example.
I’m in Las Vegas, suppose. And I meet a mind reader, or, let’s say, a man who
claims not to be a mind reader, but more technically speaking to have the
ability of telekinesis, which means that he can influence the way things behave
by pure thought. This fellow comes to me, and he says, “I will demonstrate this
to you. We will stand at the roulette wheel and I will tell you ahead of time
whether it is going to be black or red on every shot.”
I
believe, say, before I begin, it doesn’t make any difference what number you
choose for this. I happen to be prejudiced against mind readers from experience
in nature, in physics. I don’t see, if I believe that man is made out of atoms
and if I know all of the—most of the-ways atoms interact with each other, any
direct way in which the machinations in the mind can affect the ball. So from
other experience and general knowledge, I have a strong prejudice against mind
readers. Million to one.
Now
we begin. The mind reader says it’s going to be black. It’s black. The mind
reader says it’s going to be red. It’s red. Do I believe in mind readers? No.
It could happen. The mind reader says it’s going to be black. It’s black. The
mind reader says it’s going to be red. It’s red. Sweat. I’m about to learn
something. This continues, let us suppose, for ten times. Now it’s possible by
chance that that happened ten times, but the odds are a thousand to one against
it. Therefore, I now have to conclude that the odds that a mind reader is
really doing it are a thousand to one that he’s not a mind reader still, but it
was a million to one before. But if I get ten more, you see, he’ll convince me.
Not quite. One must always allow for alternative theories. There is another
theory that I should have mentioned before. As we went up to the roulette
table, I must have thought in my mind of the possibility that there is
collusion between the so-called mind reader and the people at the table. That’s
possible. Although this fellow doesn’t look like he’s got any contact with the
Flamingo Club, so I suspect that the odds are a hundred to one against that.
However, after he has run ten times favorable, since I was so prejudiced
against mind reading, I conclude it’s collusion. Ten to one. That it’s
collusion rather than accident, I mean, is ten to one, but rather more likely
collusion than not is still 10,000 to one. How is he ever going to prove he’s a
mind reader to me if I still have this terrible prejudice and now I claim it’s
collusion? Well, we can make another test. We can go to another club.
We
can make other tests. I can buy dice. And we can sit in a room and try it. We
can keep on going and get rid of all the alternative theories. It will not do
any good for that mind reader to stand in front of that particular roulette
table ad infinitum. He can predict the result, but I only conclude it is
collusion.
But
he still has an opportunity to prove he’s a mind reader by doing other things.
Now suppose that we go to another club, and it works, and another one and it
works. I buy dice and it works. I take him home and I build a roulette wheel; it
works. What do I conclude? I conclude he is a mind reader. And that’s the way,
but not certainty, of course. I have certain odds. After all these experiences
I conclude he really was a mind reader, with some odds. And now, as new
experiences grow, I may discover that there’s a way of blowing through the
corner of your mouth unseen, and so on. And when I discover that, the odds
shift again, and the uncertainties always remain. But for a long time it is
possible to conclude, by a number of tests, that mind reading really exists. If
it does, I get extremely excited, because I didn’t expect it before. I learned
something that I did not know, and as a physicist would love to investigate it
as a phenomenon of nature. Does it depend upon how far he is from the ball?
What about if you put sheets of glass or paper or other materials in between?
That’s the way all of these things have been worked out, what magnetism is,
what electricity is. And what mind reading is would also be ana-lyzable by
doing enough experiments.
Anyway,
there is an example of how to deal with uncertainty and how to look at
something scientifically. To be prejudiced against mind reading a million to
one does not mean that you can never be convinced that a man is a mind reader.
The only way that you can never be convinced that a man is a mind reader is one
of two things: If you are limited to a finite number of experiments, and he
won’t let you do any more, or if you are infinitely prejudiced at the beginning
that it’s absolutely impossible.
Now,
another example of a test of truth, so to speak, that works in the sciences
that would probably work in other fields to some extent is that if something is
true, really so, if you continue observations and improve the effectiveness of
the observations, the effects stand out more obviously. Not less obviously.
That is, if there is something really there, and you can’t see good because the
glass is foggy, and you polish the glass and look clearer, then it’s more obvious
that it’s there, not less.
I
give an example. A professor, I think somewhere in Virginia, has done a lot of
experiments for a number of years on the subject of mental telepathy, the same
kind of stuff as mind reading. In his early experiments the game was to have a
set of cards with various designs on them (you probably know all this, because
they sold the cards and people used to play this game), and you would guess
whether it’s a circle or a triangle and so on while someone else was thinking
about it. You would sit and not see the card, and he would see the card and
think about the card and you’d guess what it was. And in the beginning of these
researches, he found very remarkable effects. He found people who would guess
ten to fifteen of the cards correctly, when it should be on the average only
five. More even than that. There were some who would come very close to a
hundred percent in going through all the cards. Excellent mind readers.
A
number of people pointed out a set of criticisms. One thing, for example, is
that he didn’t count all the cases that didn’t work. And he just took the few
that did, and then you can’t do statistics anymore. And then there were a large
number of apparent clues by which signals inadvertently, or advertently, were being
transmitted from one to the other.
Various
criticisms of the techniques and the statistical methods were made by people.
The technique was therefore improved. The result was that, although five cards
should be the average, it averaged about six and a half cards over a large
number of tests. Never did he get anything like ten or fifteen or twenty-five
cards. Therefore, the phenomenon is that the first experiments are wrong. The
second experiments proved that the phenomenon observed in the first experiment
was nonexistent. The fact that we have six and a half instead of five on the
average now brings up a new possibility, that there is such a thing as mental
telepathy, but at a much lower level. It’s a different idea, because, if the
thing was really there before, having improved the methods of experiment, the
phenomenon would still be there. It would still be fifteen cards. Why is it
down to six and a half? Because the technique improved. Now it still is that
the six and a half is a little bit higher than the average of statistics, and
various people criticized it more subtly and noticed a Couple of other slight
effects which might account for the results. It turned out that people would
get tired during the tests, according to the professor. The evidence showed
that they were getting a little bit lower on the average number of agreements.
Well, if you take out the cases that are low, the laws of statistics don’t
work, and the average is a little higher than the five, and so on. So if the
man was tired, the last two or three were thrown away. Things of this nature
were improved still further. The results were that mental telepathy still
exists, but this time at 5.1 on the average, and therefore all the experiments
which indicated 6.5 were false. Now what about the five?… Well, we can go on
forever, but the point is that there are always errors in experiments that are
subtle and unknown. But the reason that I do not believe that the researchers
in mental telepathy have led to a demonstration of its existence is that as the
techniques were improved, the phenomenon got weaker. In short, the later
experiments in every case disproved all the results of the former experiments.
If remembered that way, then you can appreciate the situation.
There
has been, of course, some considerable prejudice against mental telepathy and
things of this kind, because of its arising in the mystic business of
spiritualism and all kinds of hocus-pocus in the nineteenth century. Prejudices
have a tendency to make it harder to prove something, but when something
exists, it can nevertheless often lift itself out.
One
of the interesting examples is the phenomenon of hypnotism. It took an awful
lot to convince people that hypnotism really existed. It started with Mr.
Mesmer who was curing people of hysteria by letting them sit around bathtubs
with pipes that they would hold onto and all kinds of things. But part of the
phenomenon was a hypnotic phenomenon, which had not been recognized as existing
before. And you can imagine from this beginning how hard it was to get anybody
to pay enough attention to do enough experiments. Fortunately for us, the
phenomenon of hypnotism has been extracted and demonstrated beyond a doubt even
though it had weird beginnings. So it’s not the weird beginnings which make the
thing that people are prejudiced against. They start prejudiced against it, but
after the investigation, then you could change your mind.
Another
principle of the same general idea is that the effect we are describing has to
have a certain permanence or constancy of some kind, that if a phenomenon is
difficult to experiment with, if seen from many sides, it has to have some
aspects which are more or less the same.
If
we come to the case of flying saucers, for example, we have the difficulty that
almost everybody who observes flying saucers sees something different, unless
they were previously informed of what they were supposed to see. So the history
of flying saucers consists of orange balls of light, blue spheres which bounce
on the floor, gray fogs which disappear, gossamer-like streams which evaporate
into the air, tin, round flat things out of which objects come with funny
shapes that are something like a human being.
If
you have any appreciation for the complexities of nature and for the evolution
of life on earth, you can understand the tremendous variety of possible forms
that life would have. People say life can’t exist without air, but it does
under water; in fact it started in the sea. You have to be able to move around
and have nerves. Plants have no nerves. Just think a few minutes of the variety
of life that there is. And then you see that the thing that comes out of the
saucer isn’t going to be anything like what anybody describes. Very unlikely.
It’s very unlikely that flying saucers would arrive here, in this particular
era, without having caused something of a stir earlier. Why didn’t they come
earlier? Just when we’re getting scientific enough to appreciate the
possibility of traveling from one place to another, here come the flying saucers.
There
are various arguments of a not complete nature that indicate some doubt that
the flying saucers are coming from Venus—in fact, considerable doubt. So much
doubt that it is going to take a lot of very accurate experiments, and the lack
of consistency and permanency of the characteristics of the observed phenomenon
means that it isn’t there. Most likely. It’s not worth paying much more
attention to, unless it begins to sharpen up.
I
have argued flying saucers with lots of people. (Incidentally, I must explain
that because I am a scientist does not mean that I have not had contact with
human beings. Ordinary human beings. I know what they are like. I like to go to
Las Vegas and talk to the show girls and the gamblers and so on. I have banged
around a lot in my life, so I know about ordinary people.) Anyway, I have to
argue about flying saucers on the beach with people, you know. And I was
interested in this: they keep arguing that it is possible. And that’s true. It
is possible. They do not appreciate that the problem is not to demonstrate
whether it’s possible or not but whether it’s going on or not. Whether it’s
probably occurring or not, not whether it could occur.
That
brings me to the fourth kind of attitude toward ideas, and that is that the problem
is not what is possible. That’s not the problem. The problem is what is
probable, what is happening. It does no good to demonstrate again and again
that you can’t disprove that this could be a flying saucer. We have to guess
ahead of time whether we have to worry about the Martian invasion. We have to
make a judgment about whether it is a flying saucer, whether it’s reasonable,
whether it’s likely. And we do that on the basis of a lot more experience than
whether it’s just possible, because the number of things that are possible is
not fully appreciated by the average individual. And it is also not clear,
then, to them how many things that are possible must not be happening. That
it’s impossible that everything that is possible is happening. And there is too
much variety, so most likely anything that you think of that is possible isn’t
true. In fact that’s a general principle in physics theories: no matter what a
guy thinks of, it’s almost always false. So there have been five or ten
theories that have been right in the history of physics, and those are the ones
we want. But that doesn’t mean that everything’s false.We’ll find out.
To
give an example of a case in which trying to find out what is possible is
mistaken for what is probable, I could consider the beatification of Mother
Seaton. There was a saintly woman who did very many good works for many people.
There is no doubt about that—excuse me, there’s very little doubt about that.
And it has already been announced that she has demonstrated heroicity of
virtues. At that stage in the Catholic system for determining saints, the next
question is to consider miracles. So the next problem we have is to decide
whether she performed miracles.
There
was a girl who had acute leukemia, and the doctors don’t know how to cure her.
In the duress and troubles of the family in the last minutes, many things are
tried—different medicines, all kinds of things. Among other things is the
possibility of pinning a ribbon which has touched a bone of Mother Seaton to
the sheet of the girl and also arranging that several hundred people pray for
her health. And the result is that she—no, not the result—then she gets better
from leukemia.
A
special tribunal is arranged to investigate this. Very formal, very careful,
very scientific. Everything has to be just so. Every question has to be asked
very carefully Everything that is asked is written down in a book very
carefully. There are a thousand pages of writing, translated into Italian when
it got to the Vatican. Wrapped in special strings, and so on. And the tribunal
asks the doctors in the case what this was like. And they all agreed that there
was no other case, that this was completely unusual, that at no time before had
somebody with this kind of leukemia had the disease stopped for such a long
period of time. Done. True, we don’t know what happened. Nobody knows what
happened. It was possible it was a miracle. The question is not whether it was
possible it was a miracle. It is only a question of whether it is probable it
was a miracle. And the problem for the tribunal is to determine whether it is
probable that it is a miracle. It’s a question to determine whether Mother
Seaton had anything to do with it. Oh, that they did. In Rome. I didn’t find
out how they did it, but that’s the crux of the matter.
The
question is whether the cure had anything to do with the process associated
with the praying of Mother Seaton. In order to answer a question like that, one
would have to gather all cases in which prayers had been given in the favor of
Mother Seaton for the cures of various people, in various states of disease.
They would then have to compare the success of the cure of these people with
the average cure of people for whom such prayers were not made, and so forth.
It’s an honest, straightforward way to do it, and there is nothing dishonest
and nothing sacriligious about it, because if it’s a miracle, it will hold up.
And if it’s not a miracle, the scientific method will destroy it.
The
people who study medicine and try to cure people are interested in every method
that they can find. And they have developed clinical techniques in which (all
these problems are very difficult) they are trying all kinds of medicines too,
and the woman got better. She also had chicken pox just before she got better.
Has that got anything to do with it? So there is a definite clinical way to
test what it is that might have something to do with it—by making comparisons
and so forth. The problem is not to determine that something surprising
happens. The problem is to make really good use of that to determine what to do
next, because if it does turn out that it has something to do with the prayers
of Mother Seaton, then it is worthwhile exhuming the body, which has been done,
collecting the bones, touching many ribbons to the bones, so as to get
secondary things to tie on other beds.
I
now turn to another kind of principle or idea, and that is that there is no
sense in calculating the probability or the chance that something happens after
it happens. A lot of scientists don’t even appreciate this. In fact, the first
time I got into an argument over this was when I was a graduate student at
Princeton, and there was a guy in the psychology department who was running rat
races. I mean, he has a T-shaped thing, and the rats go, and they go to the
right, and the left, and so on. And it’s a general principle of psychologists
that in these tests they arrange so that the odds that the things that happen
happen by chance is small, in fact, less than one in twenty. That means that
one in twenty of their laws is probably wrong. But the statistical ways of
calculating the odds, like coin flipping if the rats were to go randomly right
and left, are easy to work out. This man had designed an experiment which would
show something which I do not remember, if the rats always went to the right,
let’s say. I can’t remember exactly. He had to do a great number of tests,
because, of course, they could go to the right accidentally, so to get it down
to one in twenty by odds, he had to do a number of them. And its hard to do,
and he did his number. Then he found that it didn’t work. They went to the
right, and they went to the left, and so on. And then he noticed, most
remarkably, that they alternated, first right, then left, then right, then
left. And then he ran to me, and he said, “Calculate the probability for me
that they should alternate, so that I can see if it is less than one in
twenty.” I said, “It probably is less than one in twenty, but it doesn’t
count.” He said, “Why?” I said, “Because it doesn’t make any sense to calculate
after the event. You see, you found the peculiarity, and so you selected the
peculiar case.”
For
example, I had the most remarkable experience this evening. While coming in
here, I saw license plate ANZ 912. Calculate for me, please, the odds that of
all the license plates in the state of Washington I should happen to see ANZ
912. Well, it’s a ridiculous thing. And, in the same way, what he must do is
this: The fact that the rat directions alternate suggests the possibility that
rats alternate. If he wants to test this hypothesis, one in twenty, he cannot
do it from the same data that gave him the clue. He must do another experiment
all over again and then see if they alternate. He did, and it didn’t work.
Many
people believe things from anecdotes in which there is only one case instead of
a large number of cases. There are stories of different kinds of influences.
Things that happened to people, and they all remember, and how do you explain
that, they say. I can remember things in my life, too. And I give two examples
of most remarkable experiences.
The
first was when I was in a fraternity at M.I.T. I was upstairs typewriting a
theme on something about philosophy. And I was completely engrossed, not
thinking of anything but the theme, when all of a sudden in a most mysterious
fashion, there swept through my mind the idea: my grandmother has died. Now, of
course, I exaggerate slightly, as you should in all such stories. I just sort
of half got the idea for a minute. It wasn’t something strong, but I exaggerate
slightly. That’s important. Immediately after that the telephone rang
downstairs. I remember this distinctly for the reason you will now hear. The
man answered the telephone, and he called, “Hey, Pete!” My name isn’t Peter. It
was for somebody else. My grandmother was perfectly healthy, and there’s
nothing to it. Now what we have to do is to accumulate a large number of these
in order to fight the few cases when it could happen. It could happen. It might
have occurred. Its not impossible, and from then on am I supposed to believe in
the miracle that I can tell when my grandmother is dying from something in my
head? Another thing about these anecdotes is that all the conditions are not
described. And for that reason I describe another, less happy, circumstance.
I
met a girl at about thirteen or fourteen whom I loved very much, and we took
about thirteen years to get married. It’s not my present wife, as you will see.
And she got tuberculosis and had it, actually, for several years. And when she
got tuberculosis I gave her a clock which had nice big numbers that turned over
rather than ones with a dial, and she liked it. The day she got sick I gave it
to her, and she kept it by the side of her bed for four, five, six years while
she got sicker and sicker. And ultimately she died. She died at 9:22 in the
evening. And the clock stopped at 9:22 in the evening and never went again.
Fortunately, I noticed some part of the anecdote I have to tell you. After five
years the clock gets kind of weak in the knees. Every once in a while I had to
fix it, so the wheels were loose. And secondly, the nurse who had to write on
the death certificate the time of death, because the light was low in the room,
took the clock and turned it up a little bit to see the numbers a little bit
better and put it down. If I hadn’t noticed that, again I would be in some
trouble. So one must be very careful in such anecdotes to remember all the
conditions, and even the ones that you don’t notice may be the explanation of
the mystery.
So,
in short, you can’t prove anything by one occurrence, or two occurrences, and
so on. Everything has to be checked out very carefully. Otherwise you become
one of these people who believe all kinds of crazy stuff and doesn’t understand
the world they’re in. Nobody understands the world they’re in, but some people
are better off at it than others.
The
next kind of technique that’s involved is statistical sampling. I referred to
that idea when I said they tried to arrange things so that they had one in
twenty odds. The whole subject of statistical sampling is somewhat
mathematical, and I won’t go into the details. The general idea is kind of
obvious. If you want to know how many people are taller than six feet tall, then
you just pick people out at random, and you see that maybe forty of them are
more than six feet so you guess that maybe everybody is. Sounds stupid. Well,
it is and it isn’t. If you pick the hundred out by seeing which ones come
through a low door, you’re going to get it wrong. If you pick the hundred out
by looking at your friends you’ll get it wrong because they’re all in one place
in the country. But if you pick out a way that as far as anybody can figure out
has no connection with their height at all, then if you find forty out of a
hundred, then, in a hundred million there will be more or less forty million.
How much more or how much less can be worked out quite accurately. In fact, it
turns out that to be more or less correct to 1 percent, you have to have 10,000
samples. People don’t realize how difficult it is to get the accuracy high. For
only 1 or 2 percent you need 10,000 tries.
The
people who judge the value of advertising in television use this method. No,
they think they use this method. It’s a very difficult thing to do, and the
most difficult part of it is the choice of the samples. How they can arrange to
have an average guy put into his house this gadget by which they remember which
TV programs he’s looking at, or what kind of a guy an average guy is who will
agree to be paid to write in a log, and how accurately he writes in the log
what he’s listening to every fifteen minutes when a bell goes off, we don’t
know. We have no right, therefore, to judge from the thousand, or 10,000, and
that’s all it is, people who do this, who study what the average person is
looking at, because there’s no question at all that the sample is off. This
business of statistics is well known, and the problem of getting a good sample
is a very serious one, and everybody knows about it, and it’s a scientifically
OK business. Except if you don’t do it. The conclusion from all the researchers
is that all people in the world are as dopey as can be, and the only way to
tell them anything is to perpetually insult their intelligence. This conclusion
may be correct. On the other hand, it may be false. And we are making a
terrible mistake if it is false. It is, therefore, a matter of considerable
responsibility to get straightened out on how to test whether or not people pay
attention to different kinds of advertising.
As
I say, I know a lot of people. Ordinary people. And I think their intelligence
is being insulted. I mean there’s all kinds of things. You turn on the radio;
if you have any soul, you go crazy. People have a way—I haven’t learned it
yet—of not listening to it. I don’t know how to do it. So in order to prepare
this talk I turned on the radio for three minutes when I was at home, and I
heard two things.
First,
I turned it on and I heard Indian music—Indians from New Mexico, Navajos. I
recognized it. I had heard them in Gallup, and I was delighted. I won’t give an
imitation of the war chant, although I would like to. I’m tempted. It’s very
interesting, and it’s deep in their religion, and it’s something that they respect.
So I would report honestly that I was pleased to see that on the radio there
was something interesting. That was cultural. So we have to be honest. If we’re
going to report, you listen for three minutes, that’s what you hear. So I kept
listening. I have to report that I cheated a little bit. I kept listening
because I liked it; it was good. It stopped. And a man said, “We are on the
warpath against automobile accidents.” And then he went on and said how you
have to be careful in automobile accidents. That’s not an insult to
intelligence; it’s an insult to the Navajo Indians, and to their religion and
their ideas. And so I listened until I heard that there is a drink of some
kind, I think it’s called Pepsi-Cola, for people who think young. So I said, all
right, that’s enough. I’ll think about that a while. First of all, the whole
idea is crazy. What is a person who thinks young? I suppose it is a person who
likes to do things that young people like to do. Alright, let them think that.
Then this is a drink for such people. I suppose that the people in the research
department of the drink company decided how much lime to put in as follows:
“Well, we used to have a drink that was just an ordinary drink, but we have to
rearrange it, not for ordinary people but for special people who think young.
More sugar.” The whole idea that a drink is especially for people who think
young is an absolute absurdity.
So
as a result of this, we get perpetually insulted, our intelligence always
insulted. I have an idea of how to beat it. People have all kinds of plans, you
know, and the ETC. is trying to straighten it out. I’ve got an easy plan.
Suppose that you purchased the use for thirty days of twenty-six billboards in
Greater Seattle, eighteen of them lighted. And you put onto the billboards a
sign which says, “Has your intelligence been insulted? Don’t buy the product.”
And then you buy a few spots on the television or the radio. In the middle of
some program a man comes up and says, “Pardon me, I’m sorry to interrupt you,
but if you find that any of the advertising that you hear insults your
intelligence or in any way disturbs you, we would advise you not to buy the
product,” and things will be straightened out as quickly as it can be. Thank
you.
Now
if anybody has any money that they want to throw around, I’d advise that as an
experiment to find out about the intelligence of the average television looker.
It’s an interesting question. It’s a quick shortcut to find out about their
intelligence. But maybe it’s a little bit expensive.
You
say, “Its not very important. The advertisers have to sell their wares,” and so
on and so on. On the other hand, the whole idea that the average person is
unintelligent is a very dangerous idea. Even if it’s true, it shouldn’t be
dealt with the way it’s dealt with.
Newspaper
reporters and commentators—there is a large number of them who assume that the
public is stupider than they are, that the public cannot understand things that
they [the reporters and the commentators] cannot understand. Now that is
ridiculous. I’m not trying to say they’re dumber than the average man, but
they’re dumber in some way than somebody else. If I ever have to explain
something scientific to a reporter, and he says what is the idea? Well, I
explain it in words of one syllable, as I would explain it to my neighbor. He
doesn’t understand it, which is possible, because he’s brought up
differently—he doesn’t fix washing machines, he doesn’t know what a motor is,
or something. In other words, he has no technical experience. There are lots of
engineers in the world. There are lots of mechanically minded people. There are
lots of people who are smarter than the reporter, say, in science, for example.
It is, therefore, his duty to report the thing, whether he understands it or
not, accurately and in the way it’s been given. The same goes in economics and
other situations. The reporters appreciate the fact that they don’t understand
the complicated business about international trade, but they report, more or
less, what somebody says, pretty closely. But when it comes to science, for
some reason or another, they will pat me on the head and explain to dopey me
that the dopey people aren’t going to understand it because he, dope, can’t
understand it. But I know that some people can understand it. Not everybody who
reads the newspaper has to understand every article in the newspaper. Some
people aren’t interested in science. Some are. At least they could find out
what it’s all about instead of discovering that an atomic bullet was used that
came out of a machine that weighed seven tons. I can’t read the articles in the
paper. I don’t know what they mean. I don’t know what kind of a machine it was
just because it weighed seven tons. And there are now sixty-two kinds of
particles, and I would like to know what atomic bullet he is referring to.
This
whole business of statistical sampling and the determining of the properties of
people by this manner is a very serious business altogether. It’s coming into
its own, but it’s used very often, and we have to be very, very careful with
it. It’s used for choice of personnel—by giving examinations to people—marriage
counseling, and things of this kind. It’s used to determine whether people get
into college, in a way that I am not in favor of, but I will leave my arguments
on this. I will address them to the people who decide who gets into Caltech.
And after I have had my arguments, I will come back and tell you something
about it. But this has one serious feature, among others, aside from the
difficulties of sampling. There is a tendency, then, to use only what can be
measured as a criterion. That is, the spirit of the man, the way he feels
toward things, may be difficult to measure. There is some tendency to have
interviews and to try to correct this. So much the better. But it’s easier to
have more examinations and not have to waste the time with the interviews, and
the result is that only those things which can be measured, actually which they
think they can measure, are what count, and a lot of good things are left out,
a lot of good guys are missed. So it’s a dangerous business and has to be very
carefully checked. The things like marriage questions, “How are you getting
along with your husband,” and so on, that appear in magazines are all nonsense.
They go something like this: “This has been tested on a thousand couples.” And
then you can tell how they answered and how you answered and tell if you are
happily married. What you do is the following. You make up a bunch of
questions, like “Do you give him breakfast in bed?” and so on and so on. And
then you give this questionnaire to a thousand people. And you have an
independent way of telling whether they are happily married, like asking them,
or something. But never mind. It doesn’t make any difference what it is, even
if the test is perfect. That’s not the part where the trouble is. Then you do
the following. You see about all the ones who are happy—how did they answer
about the breakfast in bed, how did they answer about this, how did they answer
about that? You see it’s exactly the same as my rat race, with right and left.
They have decided on the odds of the thing in terms of the one sample. What
they ought to do to be honest is to take the same test that has now been designed,
in which they know how to make the score. They’ve decided this gets five
points, that gets ten points, in such a way that the thousand that they tried
it on get marvelous scores if they are happy and lousy scores if they’re not.
But now is the test of the test. They cannot use the sample which determined
the scoring for them. That’s going backwards. They must take the test to
another thousand people, independently, and run it out to see whether the happy
ones are the ones that score high, or not. They do not do that, because it’s
too much trouble, A, and the few times that they tried it, B, it showed that
the test was no good.
Now,
looking at the troubles that we have with all the unscientific and peculiar
things in the world, there are a number of them which cannot be associated with
difficulties in how to think, I think, but are just due to some lack of
information. In particular, there are believers in astrology, of which, no
doubt, there are a number here. Astrologists say that there are days when it’s
better to go to the dentist than other days. There are days when it’s better to
fly in an airplane, for you, if you are born on such a day and such and such an
hour. And its all calculated by very careful rules in terms of the position of
the stars. If it were true it would be very interesting. Insurance people would
be very interested to change the insurance rates on people if they follow the
astrological rules, because they have a better chance when they are in the
airplane. Tests to determine whether people who go on the day that they are not
supposed to go are worse off or not have never been made by the astrologers.
The question of whether it’s a good day for business or a bad day for business
has never been established. Now what of it?
Maybe
it’s still true, yes. On the other hand, there’s an awful lot of information
that indicates that it isn’t true. Because we have a lot of knowledge about how
things work, what people are, what the world is, what those stars are, what the
planets are that you are looking at, what makes them go around more or less,
where they’re going to be in the next 2000 years is completely known. They
don’t have to look up to find out where it is. And furthermore, if you look
very carefully at the different astrologers they don’t agree with each other,
so what are you going to do? Disbelieve it. There’s no evidence at all for it.
It’s pure nonsense. The only way you can believe it is to have a general lack
of information about the stars and the world and what the rest of the things
look like. If such a phenomenon existed it would be most remarkable, in the
face of all the other phenomena that exist, and unless someone can demonstrate
it to you with a real experiment, with a real test, took people who believe and
people who didn’t believe and made a test, and so on, then there’s no point in
listening to them. Tests of this kind, incidentally, have been made in the
early days of science. It’s rather interesting. I found out that in the early
days, like in the time when they were discovering oxygen and so on, people made
such experimental attempts to find out, for example, whether missionaries—it
sounds silly; it only sounds silly because you’re afraid to test it—whether
good people like missionaries who pray and so on were less likely to be in a
shipwreck than others. And so when missionaries were going to far countries,
they checked in the shipwrecks whether the missionaries were less likely to
drown than other people. And it turned out that there was no difference. So
lots of people don’t believe that it makes any difference.
There
are, if you turn on the radio—I don’t know how it is up here; it must be the
same—in California you hear all kinds of faith healers. I’ve seen them on
television. It’s another one of those things that it exhausts me to try to
explain why it’s rather a ridiculous proposition. There is, in fact, an entire
religion that’s respectable, so called, that’s called Christian Science, that’s
based on the idea of faith healing. If it were true, it could be established,
not by the anecdotes of a few people but by the careful checks, by the
technically good clinical methods which are used on any other way of curing
diseases. If you believe in faith healing, you have a tendency to avoid other
ways of getting healed. It takes you a little longer to get to the doctor,
possibly. Some people believe it strongly enough that it takes them longer to
get to the doctor. It’s possible that the faith healing isn’t so good. It’s
possible—we are not sure—that it isn’t. And its therefore possible that there
is some danger in believing in faith healing, that its not a triviality, not
like astrology wherein it doesn’t make a lot of difference. It’s just
inconvenient for the people who believe in it that they have to do things on
certain days. It may be, and I would like to know—it should be
investigated—everybody has a right to know—whether more people have been hurt
or helped by believing in Christ’s ability to heal; whether there is more
healing or harming by such a thing. It’s possible either way. It should be
investigated. It shouldn’t be left lying for people to believe in without an
investigation.
Not
only are there faith healers on the radio, there are also radio religion people
who use the Bible to predict all kinds of phenomena that are going to happen. I
listened intrigued to a man who in a dream visited God and received all kinds
of special information for his congregation, etc. Well, this unscientific age…
But I don’t know what to do with that one. I don’t know what rule of reasoning
to use to show right away that it’s nutty. I think it just belongs to a general
lack of understanding of how complicated the world is and how elaborate and how
unlikely it would be that such a thing would work.
But
I can’t disprove, of course, without investigating more carefully. Maybe one
way would be always to ask them how do they know it’s true and to remember
maybe that they are wrong. Just remember that much anyway, because you may keep
yourself from sending in too much money
There
are also, of course, in the world a number of phenomena that you cannot beat
that are just the result of a general stupidity. And we all do stupid things,
and we know some people do more than others, but there is no use in trying to
check who does the most. There is some attempt to protect this by government
regulation, to protect this stupidity, but it doesn’t work a hundred percent.
For
example, I went on a visit to one of the desert sites to buy land. You know
they sell land, these promoters—there’s a new city going to be built. It’s
exciting. It’s marvelous. You must go. Just imagine yourself in a desert with
nothing but some flags poked here in the ground with numbers on them and street
signs with names. And so you drive in the car across the desert to find the fourth
street and so on to get to the lot 369, which is the one for you, you’re
thinking. And you stand there kicking sand in this thing discussing with the
salesman why it’s advantageous to have a corner lot and how the driveway will
be good because it will be easier to get into from that side. Worse, believe it
or not, you find yourself discussing the beach club, which is going to be on
that sea, what the rules of membership are and how many friends you’re allowed
to bring. I swear, I got into that condition.
So
when the time comes to buy the land, it turns out that the state has made an
attempt to help you. So they have a description of this particular thing that
you have read, and the man who sells you the land says it’s the law, we have to
give you this to read. They give it to you to read, and it says that this is
very much like many other real estate deals in the state of California and so
on and so on and so on. And among other things, I read that although they say
that they want to have fifty thousand people at this site, there is not water
enough for a number which I better not say or I’ll get accused of libel, but it
was very much less—I can’t remember it exactly—it was in the neighborhood of
five thousand people, somewhere like that. So, of course they had noticed that
this was in there before, and they told us that they had just found water at
another site, far away, that they were going to pump down. And when I asked
about it, they explained to me very carefully that they had just discov- ered
this and that they hadn’t had time to get it into the brochure from the state.
Hmmmm.
I’ll
give another example of the same thing. I was in Atlantic City, and I went into
one of these—well, it was sort of a store. There were a lot of seats, and
people were sitting there listening to a man speaking. And he was very
interesting. He knew all about food, and he was talking about nutrition,
different things. I remember several of the important statements which he made,
such as “even worms won’t eat white flour.” That kind of stuff. It was good. It
was interesting. It was true—maybe it wasn’t true about the worms, but it was
good stuff about proteins and so on. And then he went on and described the
Federal Pure Food and Drug Act, and he explained how it protects you. He
explained that on every product that claims to be a good health food that’s
supposed to help you with minerals and this and that, there must be a label on
the bottle which tells exactly what’s in it, what it does, and all claims must
be explicit, so that if it’s wrong, so on and so on. He gives them everything.
I said, “How is he going to make any money? Out come the bottles. It comes out,
finally, that he sells this special health food, of course, in a brownish
bottle. And it just so happens that he has just come in, and he’s been in a
hurry, and he hasn’t had time to put the labels on. And here are the labels
that belong on the bottles, and here are the bottles, and he’s in a hurry to
sell them, and he gives you the bottle, and you stick it on yourself. That man
had courage. He first explained what to do, what to worry about, and then he
went ahead and did it.
I
found another lecture which was somewhat analogous to that one. And that was
the second Danz lecture given by myself. I started out by pointing out that
things were completely unscientific, that things were uncertain, particularly
in political matters, and that there were the two nations, Russia and the
United States, at odds with each other. And then by some mystic hocus-pocus it
came out that we were the good guys and they were the bad guys. Yet, at the
beginning, there was no way to decide which was the better of the two. In fact,
that was the main point of the lecture. So by some sort of magic I produced
some kind of relative certainty out of uncertainty. I told you about the bottle
with the labels, and then I came out on the other end with a label on my
bottle. How did I do it? You have to think about it a little bit. One thing, of
course, that we can be certain of, once we’re uncertain, and that is that we
are uncertain. Somebody says “No, maybe I’m sure.” Actually, though, the
gimmick in that particular lecture, the weak point in the whole thing, the
thing that requires further development and study is this one: I made an
impassioned plea for the idea that it’s good to have an open channel, that
there’s value in uncertainty, that it’s more important to permit us to discover
new things, rather than to choose a solution that we now make up—that to choose
a solution, no matter how we choose it now is to choose a much worse thing than
what we would get if we waited and worked things out. And that’s where I made
the choice, and I am not sure of that choice. Okay. I have now destroyed
authority.
Associated
with these problems of lack of information and so forth, but particularly lack
of information, there are a number of phenomena that are more serious, I
believe, than astrology.
I,
in preparation for this lecture, investigated something that was in my town, in
the shopping center. There was a store with a flag in front. And it’s the
Americanism Center, Altadena Americanism Center. And so I went into the
Americanism Center to find out what it is, and it’s a volunteer organization.
And on the front outside, there is a Constitution and the Bill of Rights and so
on, and a letter which explains their purpose, which is to maintain rights and
so on, all in accordance with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and so
on. That’s the general idea. What they do in there is simply educative. They
have books that people could buy on the various subjects that help to teach the
ideas of citizenship and so on, and they have, among other books, also
Congressional records, pamphlets on Congressional investigations and so on, so
that people who are studying these problems can read them. They have study
groups which meet at night, and so on. So, being interested in rights for
people, I asked, since I said I didn’t know very much about it, I would like a
book on the problem of the freedom of the Negroes to vote in the South. There
was nothing. Yes, there was. There was one thing which turned up later, two
things which I saw out of the corner of my eye. One was what went on in
Mississippi according to the Oxford city fathers, and the other was a little
pamphlet called “The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
and Communism.”
So
I discussed it at some greater length to discover what was going on and talked
to the lady for a while, and she explained among other things (we talked about
many things—we did this on a friendly basis, you will be surprised to hear)
that she was not a member of the Birch Society but there was something that you
could say for the Birch Society, she saw some movie about it and so on, and
there was something that she could say for it. You’re | not a fence sitter when
you’re in the Birch Society. At least you know what you’re for, because you
don’t have to join it if you don’t want to, and this is what Mr. Welch said,
and this is the way the Birch Society is, and if you believe in this then you
join, and if you don’t believe in this then you shouldn’t join. It sounds just
like the Communist Party. It’s all very well if they have no power. But if they
have power, it’s a completely different situation. I tried to explain to her
that this is not the kind of freedom that was being talked about, that in any
organization there ought to be the possibility of discussion. That fence
sitting is an art, and it’s difficult, and it’s important to do, rather than to
go headlong in one direction or the other. Its just better to have action,
isn’t it, than to sit on the fence? Not if you’re not sure which way to go, it
isn’t.
So
I bought a couple of things there, just at random that they had. One of the
things was called “The Dan Smoot Report”—it’s a good name—and it talked about
the Constitution, and a general idea I’ll outline: that the Constitution was
right the way it was written in the first place. And all the modifications that
have come in are just the mistakes. Fundamentalists, only not in the Bible but
in the Constitution. And then it goes on to give the ratings of Congressmen in
votes, how they voted. And it said, very specifically and after explaining
about their ideas, “The following give the ratings of the congressmen and
senators with regard to whether they vote for or against the Constitution.”
Mind you that these ratings are not just an opinion, but they are based on
fact. They are a matter of voting record. Fact. There’s no opinion at all. It’s
just the voting record, and, of course, each item is either for or against the
Constitution. Naturally. Medicare is against the Constitution, and so on. I
tried to explain that they violate their own principles. According to the
Constitution there are supposed to be votes. It isn’t supposed to be automatically
determinable ahead of time on each one of the items what’s right and what’s
wrong. Otherwise there wouldn’t be the bother to invent the Senate to have the
votes. As long as you have the votes at all, then the purpose of the votes is
to try to make up your mind which is the way to go. And it isn’t possible for
somebody to determine by fact ahead of time what is the situation. It violates
its own principle.
It
starts out all right, with the good, and love, and Christ, and so on, and it
builds itself up until it’s afraid of an enemy. And then it forgets its
original idea. It turns itself inside out and becomes absolutely contrary to
the beginning. I believe that the people who start some of these things,
especially the volunteer ladies of Altadena, have a good heart and understand a
little bit that it’s good, the Constitution, and so on, but they are led astray
in the system of the thing. How, I can’t exactly get at, and what to do to keep
from doing this, I don’t exactly know.
I
went still further into the thing and found out what the study group was about,
and if you don’t mind I’ll tell you what that was about. They gave me some
papers. There were a lot of chairs, you see, in the room, and they explained to
me, yes, that evening they had a study group, and they gave me a thing which
described what they were going to study. And I made some notes from it. It had
to do with the S.P.X.R.A. In 1943 the S.P.X. research associates—which turns
out to be the … well, I’ll tell you what it turns out to be—came into being
through the professional interest of intelligence officers then on active duty
in the armed forces of the United States concerning the Soviet revival of a
long dormant tenth principle of warfare. Paralysis. See the evil. Dormant.
Mysterious. Frightening. The mystic people of the military orders have had
principles of warfare since the Roman legions. Number one. Number two. Number
three. This is number ten. We don’t have to know what number seven is. The
whole idea that there are long dormant principles of warfare, much less that
there is a tenth principle of warfare, is an absurdity. And then what is this
principle of paralysis? How are they going to use the idea? The boogie man is
now generated. How do you use the boogie man? You use the boogie man as
follows: This educational program concerns itself with all the areas where
Soviet pressure can be used to paralyze the American will to resist.
Agriculture, arts, and cultural exchange. Science, education, information
media, finance, economics, government, labor, law, medicine, and our armed
forces, and religion, that most sensitive of areas. In other words, we now have
an open machine for pointing out that everybody who says something that you
don’t agree with has been paralyzed by the mystic force of the tenth principle
of warfare.
This
is a phenomenon analogous to paranoia. It is impossible to disprove the tenth
principle. It’s only possible if you have a certain balance, a certain
understanding of the world to appreciate that it’s out of balance, to think
that the Supreme Court—which turns out to be an “instrument of global
conquest”—has been paralyzed. Everything is paralyzed. You see how fearful it
becomes, the terrible power which is demonstrated again and again by one
example after the other of this fearful force which is made up.
This
describes what a paranoia is like. A woman gets nervous. She begins to suspect
that her husband is trying to make trouble for her. She doesn’t like to let him
into the house. He tries to get into the house, proves that he’s trying to make
trouble for her. He gets a friend to try to talk to her. She knows that its a
friend, and she knows in her mind, which is going to one side, that this is
only further evidence of the terrible fright and the fear that she’s building up
in her mind. Her neighbors come over to console her for a while. It works
fairly well, for a while. They go back to their houses. The friend of the
husband goes to visit them. They are spoiled now, and they are going to tell
her husband all the terrible things she said. Oh dear, what did she say? And
he’s going to be able to use them against her. She calls up the police
department. She says, “I’m afraid.” She’s locked in her house now. She says,
“I’m afraid.” Somebody’s trying to get into the house. They come, they try to
talk to her, they realize that there is nobody trying to get into the house.
They have to go away. She remembers that her husband was important in the city.
She remembers that he had a friend in the police department. The police
department is only part of the scheme. It only proves it once again. She looks
through the window of the house, and she sees across the way someone stopping
at a neighbor’s house. What are they talking about? In the backyard, she sees
something coming up over a bush. They’re watching her with a telescope! It
turns out later to be some children playing in the back with a stick. A
continuous and perpetual buildup, until the entire population is involved. The
lawyer that she called, she remembers, was the lawyer once for a friend of her
husband’s. The doctor who has been trying to get her to the hospital is now
obviously on the side of the husband.
The
only way out is to have some balance, to think that it’s impossible that the
whole city is against her, that everybody is going to pay attention to this
husband of mine who’s such a dope, that everybody’s going to do all these
things, that there’s a complete accumulation. All the neighbors, everybody’s
against her. It’s out of proportion. It’s only out of proportion. How can you
explain to somebody who hasn’t got a sense of proportion?
And
so it is with these people. They don’t have a sense of proportion. And so they
will believe in such a possibility as the Soviet tenth principle of warfare.
The only way that I can think to beat the game is to point the following out.
They’re right. And like my friend with the bottle with the label, the Soviets
are very, very ingenious and clever indeed. They even tell us what they’re
doing to us. You see, these people, these research associates are really in the
hire of the Soviets who are using this method of paralysis. And what they want
us to do is to lose faith in the Supreme Court, to lose faith in the
Agriculture Department, to lose faith in the scientists and all the people who
help us in all kinds of ways and so on and so on, and lose faith in all sorts
of ways, and it’s a way that they have entered into this movement of freedom
that everybody wanted, this thing with all the flags and the Constitution, and
they’ve gotten in on it, and they’re getting in there, and they’re going to
paralyze it. Proof. In their own words. S.P.X.R.A. has qualified, under oath,
in the United States court as the leading, American authority on the tenth
principle. Where did they get the information? There’s only one place. From the
Soviet Union.
This
paranoia, this phenomenon—I shouldn’t call it a paranoia, I’m not a doctor, I
don’t know—but this phenomenon is a terrible one, and it has caused mankind and
individuals a terrible unhappiness.
And
another example of the same thing is the famous Protocol of the Elders of Zion,
which was a fake document. It was supposed to be a meeting of the old Jews and
the leaders of Zion in which they had gotten together and cooked up a scheme
for the domination of the world. International bankers, international, you
know… a great big marvelous machine! Just out of proportion. But it wasn’t so
far out of proportion that people didn’t believe it; and it was one of the
strongest forces in the development of anti-Semitism.
What
I am asking for in many directions is an abject honesty. I think that we should
have a more abject honesty in political matters. And I think we’ll be freer
that way.
I
would like to point out that people are not honest. Scientists are not honest
at all, either. It’s useless. Nobody’s honest. Scientists are not honest. And
people usually believe that they are. That makes it worse. By honest I don’t
mean that you only tell what’s true. But you make clear the entire situation.
You make clear all the information that is required for somebody else who is
intelligent to make up their mind.
For
example, in connection with nuclear testing, I don’t know myself whether I am
for nuclear testing or against nuclear testing. There are reasons on both
sides. It makes radioactivity, and it’s dangerous, and it’s also very bad to
have a war. But whether it’s going to be more likely to have a war or less
likely to have a war because you test, I don’t know. Whether preparation will
stop the war, or lack of preparation, I don’t know. So I’m not trying to say
I’m on either side. That’s why I can be abjectly honest on this one.
The
big question comes, of course, whether there’s a danger from radioactivity. In
my opinion the greatest danger and the greatest question on nuclear testing is
the question of its future effects. The deaths and the radioactivity which
would be caused by the war would be so many times more than the nuclear testing
that the effects that it would have in the future are far more important than
the infinitesimal amount of radioactivity produced now. How infinitesimal is
the amount, however? Radioactivity is bad. Nobody knows a good effect of
general radioactivity. So if you increase the general amount of radioactivity
in the air, you are producing something not good. Therefore nuclear testing in
this respect produces something not good. If you are a scientist, then, you
have the right and should point out this fact.
On
the other hand, the thing is quantitative. The question is how much is not
good? You can play games and show that you will kill 10 million people in the
next 2000 years with it. If I were to walk in front of a car, hoping that I
will have some more children in the future, I also will kill 10,000 people in
the next 10,000 years, if you figure it out, from a certain way of calculating.
The question is how big is the effect? And the last time … (I wish I had—I
should, of course, have checked these figures, but let me put it differently.)
The next time you hear a talk, ask the questions which I point out to you,
because I asked some questions the last time I heard a talk, and I can remember
the answers, but I haven’t checked them very recently, so I don’t have any
figures, but I at least asked the question. How much is the increase in
radioactivity compared to the general variations in the amount of radioactivity
from place to place? The amounts of background radioactivity in a wooden
building and a brick building are quite different, because the wood is less
radioactive than the bricks.
It
turns out that at the time that I asked this question, the difference in the
effects was less than the difference between being in a brick and a wooden
building. And the difference between being at sea level and being at 5000 feet
altitude was a hundred times, at least, bigger than the extra radioactivity
produced by the atomic bomb testing.
Now,
I say that if a man is absolutely honest and wants to protect the populace from
the effects of radioactivity, which is what our scientific friends often say
they are trying to do, then he should work on the biggest number, not on the
smallest number, and he should try to point out that the radioactivity which is
absorbed by living in the city of Denver is so much more serious, is a hundred
times bigger than the background from the bomb, that all the people of Denver
ought to move to lower altitudes. The situation really is—don’t get frightened
if you live in Denver—it’s small. It doesn’t make much difference. It’s only a
tiny effect. But the effect from the bombs is less than the difference between
being at low level and high level, I believe. I’m not absolutely sure. I ask
you to ask that question to get some idea whether you should be very careful
about not walking into a brick building, as careful as you are to try to stop
nuclear testing for the sole reason of radioactivity. There are many good
reasons that you may feel politically strong about, one way or the other. But
that’s another question.
We
are, in the scientific things, getting into situations in which we are related
to the government, and we have all kinds of lack of honesty. Particularly, lack
of honesty is in the reporting and description of the adventures of going to
different planets and in the various space adventures. To take an example, we can
take the Mariner II voyage to Venus. A tremendously exciting thing, a marvelous
thing, that man has been able to send a thing 40 million miles, a piece of the
earth at last to another place. And to get so close to it as to get a view that
corresponds to being 20,000 miles away. It’s hard for me to explain how
exciting that is, and how interesting. And I’ve used up more time than I ought.
The
story of what happened during the trip was equally interesting and exciting.
The apparent breakdown. The fact that they had to turn all the instruments off
for a while because they were losing power in the batteries and the whole thing
would stop. And then they were able to turn it on again. The fact of how it was
heating up. How one thing after the other didn’t work and then began to work.
All the accidents and the excitement of a new adventure. Just like sending
Columbus, or Magellan, around the world. There were mutinies, and there were
troubles and there were shipwrecks, and there was the whole works. And it’s an exciting
story. When it, for example, heated up, it was said in the paper, “It’s heating
up, and we’re learning from that.” What could we be learning? If you know
something, you realize you can’t learn anything. You put satellites up near the
earth, and you know how much radiation you get from the sun . .. we know that.
And how much do they get when they get near Venus? Its a definitely accurate
law, well known, inverse square. The closer you get, the brighter the light.
Easy. So it’s easy to figure out how much white and black to paint the thing so
that the temperature adjusts itself.
The
only thing we learned was that the fact that it got hot was not due to anything
else than the fact that the thing was made in a very great hurry at the last
minute and some changes were made in the inside apparatus, so that there was
more power developed in the inside and it got hotter than it was designed for.
What we learned, therefore, was not scientific. But we learned to be a little
bit careful about going in such a hurry on these things and keep changing our
minds at the last minute. By some miracle the thing almost worked when it was
there. It was meant to look at Venus by making a series of passes across the
planet, looking like a television screen, twenty-one passes across the planet.
It made three. Good. It was a miracle. It was a great achievement. Columbus
said he was going for gold and spices. He got no gold and very little spices.
But it was a very important and very exciting moment. Mariner was supposed to
go for big and important scientific information. It got none. I tell you it got
none. Well, I’ll correct it in a minute. It got practically none. But it was a
terrific and exciting experience. And in the future more will come from it.
What it did find out, from looking at Venus, they say in the paper, was that
the temperature was 800 degrees or something, under the surface of the clouds.
That was already known. And it’s being confirmed today, even now, by using the
telescope at Palomar and making measurements on Venus from the earth. How
clever. The same information could be gotten from looking from the Earth: I
have a friend who has information on this, and he has a beautiful map of Venus
in his room, with contour lines and hot and cold and different temperatures in
different parts. In detail. From the earth. Not just three swatches with some
spots of up and down. There was one piece of information that was obtained—that
Venus has no magnetic field around it like the earth has—and that was a piece
of information that could not have been obtained from here.
There
was also very interesting information on what was going on in the space in
between, on the way from here to Venus. It should be pointed out that if you
don’t try to make the thing hit a planet, you don’t have to put extra
correcting devices inside, you know, with extra rockets to re-steer it. You
just shoot it off. You can put more instruments in, better instruments, more
carefully designed, and if you really want to find out what there is in the
space in between, you don’t have to make such a to-do about going to Venus. The
most important information was on the space in between, and if we want that
information, then please let us send another one that isn’t necessary to go to
a planet and have all the complications of steering it.
Another
thing is the Ranger program. I get sick when I read in the paper about, one
after the other, five of them that don’t work. And each time we learn
something, and then we don’t continue the program. We’re learning an awful lot.
We’re learning that somebody forgot to close a valve, that somebody let sand
into another part of the instrument. Sometimes we learn something, but most of
the time we learn only that there’s something the matter with our industry, our
engineers and our scientists, that the failure of our program, to fail so many
times, has no reasonable and simple explanation. It’s not necessary that we
have so many failures, as far as I can tell. There’s something the matter in
the organization, in the administration, in the engineering, or in the making
of these instruments. It’s important to know that. It’s not worthwhile knowing
that we’re always learning something.
Incidentally,
people ask me, why go to the moon? Because it’s a great adventure in science.
Incidentally, it also develops technology. You have to make all these
instruments to go to the moon—rockets, and so on—and it’s very important to
develop technology. Also it makes scientists happy, and if scientists are happy
maybe they’ll work on something else good for warfare. Another possibility is a
direct military use of space. I don’t know how, nobody knows how, but there may
turn out to be a use. Anyway, it’s possible that if we keep on developing the
military aspects of long-range flying to the moon that we’ll prevent the
Russians from making some military use that we can’t figure out yet. Also there
are indirect military advantages. That is, if you build bigger rockets, then
you can use them more directly by going directly from here to some other part
of the earth instead of having to go to the moon. Another good reason is a
propaganda reason. We’ve lost some face in front of the world by letting the
other guys get ahead in technology. It’s good to be able to try to get that
face back. None of these reasons alone is worthwhile and can explain our going
to the moon. I believe, however, that if you put them all together, plus all
the other reasons which I can’t think of, it’s worth it.
Well,
I gotcha.
I
would like to talk about one other thing, and that is, how do you get new
ideas? This is for amusement for the students here, mostly. How do you get new
ideas? That you do by analogy, mostly, and in working with analogy you often
make very great errors. It’s a great game to try to look at the past, at an
unscientific era, look at something there, and say have we got the same thing
now, and where is it? So I would like to amuse myself with this game. First, we
take witch doctors. The witch doctor says he knows how to cure. There are
spirits inside which are trying to get out. You have to blow them out with an
egg, and so on. Put a snakeskin on and take quinine from the bark of a tree.
The quinine works. He doesn’t know he’s got the wrong theory of what happens.
If I’m in the tribe and I’m sick, I go to the witch doctor. He knows more about
it than anyone else. But I keep trying to tell him he doesn’t know what he’s
doing and that someday when people investigate the thing freely and get free of
all his complicated ideas they’ll learn much better ways of doing it. Who are
the witch doctors? Psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, of course. If you look at
all of the complicated ideas that they have developed in an infinitesimal
amount of time, if you compare to any other of the sciences how long it takes
to get one idea after the other, if you consider all the structures and
inventions and complicated things, the ids and the egos, the tensions and the
forces, and the pushes and the pulls, I tell you they can’t all be there. It’s
too much for one brain or a few brains to have cooked up in such a short time.
However, I remind you that if you’re in the tribe, there’s nobody else to go
to.
And
now I can have some more fun, and this is especially for the students of this
university. I thought, among other people, of the Arabian scholars of science
during the Middle Ages. They did a little bit of science themselves, yes, but
they wrote commentaries on the great men that came before them. They wrote
commentaries on commentaries. They described what each other wrote about each
other. They just kept writing these commentaries. Writing commentaries is some
kind of a disease of the intellect. Tradition is very important. And freedom of
new ideas, new possibilities, are disregarded on the grounds that the way it
was is better than anything I can do. I have no right to change this or to
invent anything or to think of anything. Well, those are your English
professors. They are steeped in tradition, and they write commentaries. Of
course, they also teach us, some of us, English. That’s where the analogy
breaks down.
Now
if we continue in the analogy here, we see that if they had a more enlightened
view of the world there would be a lot of interesting problems. Maybe, how many
parts of speech are there? Shall we invent another part of speech? Ooohhhhh!
Well,
then how about the vocabulary? Have we got too many words? No, no. We need them
to express ideas. Have we got too few words? No. By some accident, of course,
through the history of time, we happened to have developed the perfect
combination of words.
Now
let me get to a lower level still in this question. And that is, all the time
you hear the question, “why can’t Johnny read?” And the answer is, because of
the spelling. The Phoenicians, 2000, more, 3000, 4000 years ago, somewhere
around there, were able to figure out from their language a scheme of
describing the sounds with symbols. It was very simple. Each sound had a
corresponding symbol, and each symbol, a corresponding sound. So that when you
could see what the symbols’ sounds were, you could see what the words were
supposed to sound like. It’s a marvelous invention. And in the period of time
things have happened, and things have gotten out of whack in the English
language. Why can’t we change the spelling? Who should do it if not the professors
of English? If the professors of English will complain to me that the students
who come to the universities, after all those years of study, still cannot
spell “friend,” I say to them that something’s the matter with the way you
spell friend.
And
also, it can be argued, perhaps, if they wish, that it’s a question of style
and beauty in the language, and that to make new words and new parts of speech
might destroy that. But they cannot argue that respelling the words would have
anything to do with the style. There’s no form of art form or literary form,
with the sole exception of crossword puzzles, in which the spelling makes a bit
of difference to the style. And even crossword puzzles can be made with a
different spelling. And if it’s not the English professors that do it, and if
we give them two years and nothing happens—and please don’t invent three ways
of doing it, just one way, that everybody is used to—if we wait two or three
years and nothing happens, then we’ll ask the philologists and the linguists
and so on because they know how to do it. Did you know that they can write any
language with an alphabet so that you can read how it sounds in another
language when you hear it? That’s really something. So they ought to be able to
do it in English alone.
One
thing else I would leave to them. This does show, of course, that there are
great dangers in arguing from analogy. And these dangers should be pointed out.
I don’t have time to do that, and so I leave to your English professors the
problem of pointing out the errors of reasoning by analogy.
Now
there are a number of things, positive things, in which a scientific type of
reasoning works, and in which considerable progress has been made, and I’ve
been picking out a number of the negative things. I want you to know I
appreciate positive things. (I also appreciate that I’m talking too long, so I
will mention them only. But it’s out of proportion. I wanted to spend more
time.) There are a number of things in which rational people work very hard
using methods which are quite sensible. And nobody’s bothered with them, yet.
For
instance, people have arranged traffic systems and arranged the way the traffic
will work in other cities. Criminal detection is at a pretty high level of
knowing how to get evidence, how to judge evidence, how to control your
emotions on the evidence, and so on.
We
shouldn’t only think of the technological inventions when we consider the
progress of man. There are an enormous number of most important
non-technological inventions which mustn’t be disregarded. Economic inventions
in checks, for example, and banks, things of this nature. International
financial arrangements, and so on, are marvelous inventions. And they are
absolutely essential and represent a great advance. Systems of accounting, for
example. Business accounting is a scientific process—I mean, is not a
scientific, maybe, but a rational process. A system of law has been gradually
developed. There is a system of laws and juries and judges. And although there
are, of course, many faults and flaws, and we must continue to work on them, I
have great admiration for that. And also the development of government
organizations which have been going on through the years. There are a large
number of problems which have been solved in certain countries in ways that we
sometimes can understand and sometimes we cannot. I remind you of one, because
it bothers me. And that has to do with the fact that the government really has
the problem of the control of the forces. And most of the time there has been
trouble because the strongest forces try to get control of the government. It
is marvelous, is it not, that someone with no force can control someone with
force. And so the difficulties in the Roman empire, with the Praetorian guards,
seemed insoluble, because they had more force than the Senate. Yet in our
country we have a sort of discipline of the military, so that they never try to
control the Senate directly. People laugh at the brass. They tease them all the
time. No matter how many things we’ve stuffed down their throats, we civilians
have still been able to control the military! I think that the military’s
discipline in knowing what its place is in the government of the United States
is one of our great heritages and one of the very valuable things, and I don’t
think that we should keep pushing on them so hard until they get impatient and
break out from their self-imposed discipline. Don’t misunderstand me. The
military has a large number of faults, like anything else. And the way they handled
Mr. Anderson, I believe his name was, the fellow who was supposed to have
murdered somebody and so on, is an example of what would happen if they did
take over.
Now,
if I look to the future, I should talk about the future development of
mechanics, the possibilities that will arise because we have almost free energy
when we get to controlled fusion. And in the near future the developments in
biology will make problems like no one has ever seen before. The very rapid
developments of biology are going to cause all kinds of very exciting problems.
I haven’t time to describe them, so I just refer you to Aldous Huxley’s book
Brave New World, which gives some indication of the type of problem that future
biology will involve itself in.
One
thing about the future I look to with favor. I think there are a lot of things
working in the right direction. In the first place, the fact that there are so
many nations and they hear each other, on account of the communications, even
if they try to close their ears. And so there are all kinds of opinions running
around, and the net result is that it’s hard to keep ideas out. And some of the
troubles that the Russians are having in holding down people like Mr. Nakhrosov
are a kind of trouble that I hope will continue to develop.
One
other point that I would like to take a moment or two to make a little bit more
in detail is this one: The problem of moral values and ethical judgments is one
into which science cannot enter, as I have already indicated, and which I don’t
know of any particular way to word. However, I see one possibility. There may
be others, but I see one possibility. You see we need some kind of a mechanism,
something like the trick we have to make an observation and believe it, a
scheme for choosing moral values. Now in the days of Galileo there were great
arguments about what makes a body fall, all kinds of arguments about the medium
and the pushes and the pulls and so on. And what Galileo did was disregard all
the arguments and decide if it fell and how fast it fell, and just describe
that. On that everybody could agree. And keep on studying in that direction, on
what everyone can agree, and never mind the machinery and the theory
underneath, as long as possible. And then gradually, with the accumulation of
experience, you find other theories underneath that are more satisfactory,
perhaps. There were in the early days of science terrible arguments about, for
instance, light. Newton did some experiments which showed that a light beam
separated and spread with a prism would never get separated again. Why did he
have to argue with Hooke? He had to argue with Hooke because of the theories of
the day about what light was like and so on. He wasn’t arguing whether the
phenomenon was right. Hooke took a prism and saw that it was true.
So
the question is whether it is possible to do something analogous (and work by
analogy) with moral problems. I believe that it is not at all impossible that
there be agreements on consequences, that we agree on the net result, but maybe
not on the reason we do what we ought to do. That the argument that existed in
the early days of the Christians as to, for instance, whether Jesus was of a
substance like the Father or of the same substance as the Father, which when
translated into the Greek became the argument between the Homoiousions and the
Homoousians. Laugh, but people were hurt by that. Reputations were destroyed,
people were killed, arguing whether it’s the same or similar. And today we
should learn that lesson and not have an argument as to the reason why we agree
if we agree.
I
therefore consider the Encyclical of Pope John XXIII, which I have read, to be
one of the most remarkable occurrences of our time and a great step to the
future. I can find no better expression of my beliefs of morality, of the
duties and responsibilities of mankind, people to other people, than is in that
encyclical. I do not agree with some of the machinery which supports some of
the ideas, that they spring from God, perhaps, I don’t personally believe, or
that some of these ideas are the natural consequence of ideas of earlier popes,
in a natural and perfectly sensible way. I don’t agree, and I will not ridicule
it, and I won’t argue it. I agree with the responsibilities and with the duties
that the Pope represents as the responsibilities and the duties of people. And
I recognize this encyclical as the beginning, possibly, of a new future where
we forget, perhaps, about the theories of why we believe things as long as we
ultimately in the end, as far as action is concerned, believe the same thing.
Thank
you very much. I enjoyed myself.